Kendra's Law's day-to-day operationalization, the on-going constitutional challenges, 11 the law's potential impact on the delivery of other mental health services in the state, and-most important-the inevitability of a "mistake" (a case in which denial of a Kendra's Law commitment is followed by the commission of a notorious criminal act, or a case in which entry of a Kendra's Law commitment is followed by a patient developing neuroleptic malignant syndrome or some other potentially-fatal antipsychotic drug side effect because of a misdiagnosis or an error in prescription or medication dispensation) all make it inevitable that it will become the centerpiece of the next mental health law debate. 12 It is thus especially important that a discussion of Kendra's Law also provide a national perspective as well as background on OPC -and how, for decades, OPC has been the paradigm trompe d'oeil illusion of mental disability law. In this paper I will do the following: First, I will offer some perspectives on the relationship between involuntary civil commitment and outpatient commitment, with a few brief words about how all of this relates to the concept of the "least restrictive alternative" (LRA). 13 Then, I will consider some of the empirical research that has been done on outpatient commitment laws in other jurisdictions-most notably, North Carolina-and focus on both the issues that seemed to matter whether OPC "worked" and on the impact OPC may have had on "revolving door" commitments.
14 After that, I will look at the most controversial aspect of outpatient commitment: its relationship to forced drugging. 15 Here, I will consider briefly the civil libertarian critique of OPC/forced drugging laws; I will take a brief look at some important recent developments, and I will also briefly mention the state-ofthe-art research done by the MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and weigh some of its pertinent conclusions. 16 Finally, I will look closely at Kendra's Law. Here, I will provide a brief overview of the law itself, and will identify some "pressure points" and pivotal 11 On some of the enforced medication issues that are at the core of Kendra's Law, the NY Court of Appeals has relied on state constitutional law so as to provide persons with mental disabilities far more constitutional rights than they might receive under the federal constitution. See Rivers v. Katz, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986) . 12 On the way one vivid case inevitably overwhelms statistical data of hundreds or thousands of other less vivid cases, see generally, Michael [OPC] has been fueled by concerns with societal violence and inflamed by high profile cases. Policy changes should not be based solely on these few cases, but instead should derive from a firm foundation of research and experience"). 13 issues in the law. 17 I believe that there are ambiguities in some of the "pressure points" that cry out for resolution, and that the appellate disposition of some of the pivotal issues will provide some clues as to the ultimate "real life" impact of Kendra's Law. 18 Finally, I will consider the TJ implications of Kendra's Law, in part, in an effort to determine how it "fits" into the public's "take" on all of mental disability law. 
A. The "LRA" Roots
Trailblazing constitutional involuntary civil commitment cases such as Lessard v. Schmidt-the 1972 Wisconsin federal court decision that struck down that state's old civil commitment code 21 and served as the model for involuntary civil commitment revisions in nearly every state 22 -first applied the concept of the "LRA" to the involuntary civil commitment process. 23 The theory was this: As "the most basic and fundamental right" is "the right to be free from unwanted restraint," the court concluded that "persons suffering from the condition of being mentally ill, but who are not alleged to have committed any crime, cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if there are less drastic means for achieving the same basic goal." 24 The Lessard court placed the burden for exploring alternatives to institutionalization on the party recommending full-time involuntary hospitalization, and ordered that that party prove:
(a) what alternatives are available; (b) what alternatives were investigated; and (c) why the investigated alternatives were not deemed suitable. These alternatives include voluntary or court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in a hospital, night treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody of a friend or relative, placement in a nursing home, referral to a community mental health clinic, and home health aide services. 25 Other jurisdictions subsequently adopted Lessard's reasoning in their commitment codes. Moreover, other courts quickly expanded the scope of the LRA doctrine beyond involuntary civil commitment decision making 26 
B. The First Generation of Studies
A major study commissioned by the National Center for State Courts listed these factors as essential in any assessment of an LRA determination: the environmental restrictiveness of the treatment setting; the psychological or physical restrictiveness of behavioral, chemical, or biological treatment; clinical variables, including the person's behavior as it relates to the legal criteria for involuntary commitment; the relative risks and benefits of treatment alternatives; the family and community support available in the person's environment; the quality or likely effectiveness of the alternative care and treatment; the duration of treatment; the likelihood that a person may pose a risk to public safety; the availability, cost, and accessibility of alternative treatment and care; the likelihood of the person's cooperation or compliance with the conditions of alternative treatment programs; and mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing that compliance. 30 Thus, any TJ consideration of Kendra's Law-or any other contemporaneous AOT law-must be considered in the context of these factors. Expound on this, perhaps use an example or case study about why these are intrinsically related to TJ.
II. Early OPC Laws
Early OPC laws flowed from the application of these LRA principles in an effort to narrow-not widen-the net of those subject to involuntary civil commitment. For example, the North Carolina law-universally seen as the paradigmatic outpatient commitment statute-allowed "an examining mental health professional to recommend outpatient commitment in the case of a mentally ill 574 (Ariz. App. 1985) (order for treatment which committed patient to program of combined in-patient and out-patient treatment was void, absent showing that court was presented with and approved written treatment plan; order vacated); see also In re J.M.R., 505 A.2d 662 (Vt. 1986) (trial court could not continue involuntary treatment on non-hospitalized basis for indeterminate time, absent any finding that patient was dangerous to himself or others, or would become so if treatment plan was discontinued). But see In re Harhut, 367 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court erred in prescribing specific treatment programs, in ordering the county to prepare treatment reports and the hospital to submit a program plan to the court, and in ordering the county to create community placements in a commitment order was "not only more rational in terms of human costs, but also . . . more rational in terms of financial costs to the taxpayer."
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On the other hand, another North Carolina survey conducted by other researchers reported that the new statute had little impact on the use of outpatient commitment, 41 reporting that, while the number of cases in which hospital staff recommended outpatient treatment significantly increased after the effective date of statutory change. 42 The percentage of cases studied in which outpatient commitment was ordered actually decreased slightly.
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A follow-up study by the same researchers focused on several reasons why, in their view, outpatient commitment had not become a particularly significant "therapeutic modality": 44 (a) court reluctance to employ outpatient commitment when "dangerousness" is a commitment criteria; 45 149 (1984) . 45 Id. On the other hand, the researchers indicate that, in some circumstances, courts improperly overutilize outpatient commitment "when the judge is convinced that further treatment is advisable but feels that the legal evidence is insufficient to justify inpatient commitment," using outpatient commitment as a sort of plea bargain-compromise. Id. Until these entrenched attitudes change, outpatient commitment will not become a realistic alternative to hospitalization. Despite legal sanctions, outpatient commitment is too easily sabotaged to succeed without cooperation from all parties.
Id. at 151.
B. More Recent Studies
The majority of the studies just referred to were done in the 1980's. What can be learned from the more recent studies? Perhaps the most interesting was one done by Randy Borum and his colleagues investigating the beliefs of persons with mental illness about the provisions and implications of outpatient commitment laws. 49 Borum questions "what obligations, if any, do clinicians have to educate respondents about the actual provisions and limitations of their outpatient commitment?" 50 Borum's research-a survey of over 300 North Carolina patients subject to OPC-had revealed that eighty-three percent believed incorrectly that the OPC order itself permitted the forcible administration of involuntary medications. 51 To what extent must judges ensure that individuals subject to Kendra's Law understand that law's limitations on this matter?
Other studies have begun to fill in some of the gaps in the research picture. They suggest that, empirically, outpatient commitment can work to reduce hospital readmissions and total hospital days, that patients who keep postdischarge follow-up appointments had a far lower chance of being rehospitalized than those who did not keep such appointments, 52 but that, to succeed, a "substantial commitment of treatment resources" is required. 53 Other scholars and clinicians have recently cautioned about the "unintended negative consequences" of extending the use of coercive techniques through OPC. Leonard Stein and Ronald Diamond, for instance, note that mandatory OPC "may raise concerns among other persons with mental illness that such orders could be used against them," thus "frightening . . . potential clients away from the treatment system."
54 Similarly, Michael Hoge and Elizabeth Grottole argue that, because OPC covers individuals not otherwise subject to forced medication to take such medication against their will (through reliance on the patients' mistaken belief that medications would otherwise be forced), it thus "devalues the individuals being served, and undermines the physician-patient relationship . . . . A strategy that relies on patient misinformation to foster its success violates ethics principles, the integrity of the physician-patient relationship, and the notion of informed consent." 55 The question of coercion was given a different, but very troubling, spin 4 years ago at the American Psychiatric Association national conference on preKendra's outpatient commitment laws. There, Dr. Susan Stabinsky reported that "most" of the mandated patients she had observed were women "forced into treatment as a condition of getting their children back."
56 At the same meeting, Dr. Kenneth Gilbert expressed his discomfort with the possibility that AOPC was being used to "serv[e] the ends" of the criminal justice system. 57 It is surprising that there has been so little attention paid to this troubling data. 
III. Forced Drugging
There is no question that the most controversial aspect of contemporary OPC laws is the linkage between commitment and forced drugging, and it is likely that this will be the part of Kendra's Law and other recent laws that will receive the most attention (both in the press and in the academic commentaries). In a powerful-and to my mind, generally persuasive-critique from a civil libertarian perspective, Steven Schwartz and Cathy Costanzo focus on outpatient commitment as "an expression of the much enlarged authority which developed over the past century to promote the health or interests of persons considered to be mentally infirm," and characterize it as a "significant distortion of the historical 54 purposes and benign motivation of the parens patriae principle," 61 and, primarily, as a "guise for substantially modifying the criteria for state-imposed psychiatric intervention." 62 Additionally, Professor Susan Stefan has "unpacked" outpatient commitment to differentiate "traditional" outpatient commitments (premised on least restrictive alternative constructs and conditional release schemata) from the post-deinstitutionalization model which she characterizes as "preventive commitment" (PC). 63 According to Stefan, by focusing on the specter of deterioration, an implied presumption of incompetency, and an assumed availability of treatment, 64 PC "broadens the class of people subject to commitment, and expands the conditions under which the state can intervene in a person's life." 65 Both Stefan and Schwartz/Costanzo focus sharp criticism on precisely the issue which is frequently seen as the linchpin of outpatient commitment's efficiency value: its use as a tool to compel medication compliance in the community. 66 Stefan characterizes forced medication as the "core of outpatient commitment;" 67 Schwartz and Costanzo speculate that outpatient commitment "already has or will become synonymous with forced medications. the right to refuse admission to state hospital outpatients.
70 If OPC's success depends on the dedication of CMHCs to "making [it] work," the concern that such facilities may pay only "lip service" to the status may force a reconsideration of OPC as a tool by which to enforce community drugging.
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One of the implicit "givens" of the contemporary OPC debate is that persons with mental illness are not competent-in a lay sense, if not in a legal sense-to decide whether to self-medicate in a community setting. 72 And this assumption has rarely been challenged. 73 But, important conceptual light has been shed on this entire murky area of the law by the publication of research by the MacArthur Foundation's Network on Mental Health and the Law (the "Network"). 74 For the past decade, the Network has conducted an extensive study of three areas that are essential to an informed understanding of mental disability law: competence, coercion, and risk. 75 The competence aspect of the research 76 reports on the researchers' attempts to develop a reliable and valid information base upon which to address clinical and policy questions about mentally disabled persons' ability to provide informed consent to treatment.
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Among the Network's findings of significance to the question that I address in this article are the conclusions that mental patients are not always incompetent 70 to make rational decisions and that mental patients are not inherently more incompetent than nonmentally ill patients. 78 In fact, on "any given measure of decisional abilities, the majority of patients with schizophrenia did not perform more poorly than other patients and nonpatients." 79 In short, the presumption in which courts have regularly engaged-that there is both a de facto and de jure presumption of incompetency to be applied to medication decision making 80 -appears to be based on an empirical fallacy: psychiatric patients are not necessarily more incompetent than nonmentally ill persons to engage in independent medication decision making. If this is so, then it appears that the Stefan/Schwartz & Costanzo critique is largely accurate, and that statutes that suggest a de facto presumption of incompetency are not merely likely unconstitutional, but are also based on a critical misreading of the empirical data.
IV. Kendra's Law
With this as backdrop, I will turn my attention to Kendra's Law, 81 and first, consider briefly the legislative findings. 82 The legislature makes clear its intent in passing this act:
The legislature finds that there are mentally ill persons who are capable of living in the community with the help of family, friends and mental health professionals, but who, without routine care and treatment, may relapse and become violent or suicidal, or require hospitalization. The legislature further finds that there are mentally ill persons who can function well and safely in the community with supervision and treatment, but who without such assistance, will relapse and require long periods of hospitalization.
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Under Kendra's Law, a court may order a person to submit to assisted outpatient treatment if the court finds that the patient • is at least 18 years of age, and; • suffers from a mental illness; and, • is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision, as deemed by a clinical determination; and, has a history of noncompliance with treatments that has resulted in one or more seriously violent acts, threats of violence or attempted violence, toward self or others within the last 48 months, or which has resulted in a hospitalization or receipt of mental health services at a correctional facility at least twice within the last 36 months-excluding the period of hospitalization or incarceration immediately prior to the filing of the petition; and, 78 Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 73, at 120 (discussing research in Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 75). 79 • is unlikely to voluntarily participate in treatment; and, • will likely benefit from treatment and needs such treatment in order to prevent behavior likely to result in serious harm to the patient or others. 84 Court proceedings are initiated by petitions. Potential petitioners include parents, spouses, persons with whom the subject resides, children, siblings, a qualified treating psychiatrist, or a probation or parole officer charged with supervising the individual. 85 The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit of a physician-not the petitioner-who attests either that he or she has examined the patient within 10 days and recommends assisted outpatient treatment, or that the physician has been unable to examine the patient because of non-cooperation by the patient and that "such physician has reason to suspect that the subject of the petition meets the criteria for assisted outpatient treatment . . ." 86 The statute provides for a hearing on notice to the patient/respondent who is entitled to counsel 87 at which the physician submitting the affidavit must testify, 88 present a treatment plan, and establish that it is the "least restrictive" alternative available. 89 The court may also order an involuntary examination of the respondent. 90 After the hearing, the court may order the subject of the petition to receive assisted outpatient treatment for an initial period of no greater than six months. 91 Before issuing this order, however, the court must find that the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the subject meets the criteria for assisted outpatient treatment and that there is no appropriate or feasiblely less restrictive alternative. 92 Again, the most controversial aspect of Kendra's Law deals with enforced medication. The court's order may also require the patient to self-administer psychotropic drugs or accept the administration of such drugs by authorized personnel as part of an assisted outpatient treatment program, 93 but may not order treatment that has not been recommended by the examining physician and included in the written treatment plan. 94 Such treatment may be ordered for periods of up to 1 year. 95 One issue that has arisen in other OPC jurisdictions is the availability of contempt as a remedy for noncompliant patients. For instance, in two Indiana cases, outpatients were held by trial courts to be in criminal contempt for failing to adhere to medication regimens. In one, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in so doing without determining whether the patient's conduct was "willful [or] a manifestation of mental illness." 96 In the other, after an intermediate appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding where patient's counsel expressly stated that the refusal was "willful and voluntary," 97 the state supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court had no authority either to order the patient to take medication as an outpatient or to hold him in contempt for refusing to do so. 98 But under Kendra's Law, a patient who fails or refuses to comply with a treatment plan authorized by the court cannot be held in contempt of court. 99 The only recourse available is if a physician finds such person to be in need of involuntary admission to a hospital, pursuant to MENTAL HYG. L. § 9.27, or in need of "immediate observation, care and treatment pursuant" to § 9.39 or § 9.40. 100 Such an individual can be transported to a hospital and held up to 72 hr to determine if he or she is in need of "involuntary care and treatment." 101 The statute specifically provides, however, that "an order of assisted outpatient treatment shall not be grounds for involuntary civil commitment . . . "
V. Unanswered Questions
What questions are left unanswered by this law? There are many, but I believe that this is a helpful sample of those that require clarification and/or resolution:
Its relationship to other New York law: What is the relationship between
Kendra's Law and other New York OPC legislation, specifically the Bellevue pilot program authorized by Mental Hygiene Law § 9.61? 103 An exhaustive study of the Bellevue program found little outcome difference between individuals who participated in that program and a control group (although the authors of the study noted that several contextual factors, including sample size and lack of enforcement mechanisms, "constrain the conclusions that can be drawn from these data"); 104 how significant are these results to a Kendra's law analysis?
2. The implications of "widening the net": What are the implications of "widening the universe of persons who are potentially subject to commitment, the state must then take on the added burden of creating a system which is capable of absorbing the additional committees"? 105 Although this means providing extra funds for extra lawyers, mental health professionals and expert witnesses, the proposed legislation has no funding provisions for such system participants. Section 47.03 of the MENTAL HYGIENE LAW was amended to authorize the commissioner of mental health to make grants to provide medication to persons subject to Kendra's Law 106 and to develop plans by which medications can be prescribed and administered, 107 but these grants are apparently to come from existing funds, as the law specifies "within amounts appropriated therefore." 108 3. Time period allocations: How significant is the short amount of time (3 days) which counsel is given to prepare cases. 109 The problems here may be exacerbated because the persons subject to Kendra hearings are not yet in a hospital setting at the time the petition is filed, and thus are "much harder to track down," 110 leading to the possibility that vigorous advocacy-always a problem in cases involving persons with serious mental disabilities-may be impossible. 111 Interestingly, Dr. Howard Telson-a clinical assistant professor of psychiatry at New York University-concurred, saying that the Kendra's Law petition and hearing process will be more "cumbersome" because it deals with individuals outside the hospital system. 120 See Perlin, supra note 58, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted):
The proliferation of so-called assisted outpatient commitment (AOPC) statutes-of which New York's Kendra's Law is the most well-known example-and of sexually violent predator acts (SVPA)-of which New Jersey's Megan's Law is often seen as the exemplar but which has been subject to Supreme Court scrutiny elsewhere in the cases of Kansas v. Hendricks and the Washington case of Seling v. Young-have blurred the borderline between civil and criminal mental disability law in some very troubling and problematic ways, and threaten to make this are of the law even more pretextual than it currently is. Laws such as these enforce social control in punitive ways under the guise of the beneficence of civil commitment. Although the universes of individuals subject to statutes such as Kendra's Law and Megan's Law appear quite different-in the first instance, persons not subject to the inpatient involuntary civil commitment power but who may be in danger of deterioration in the absence of forced treatment; in the second, persons who have been charged and/or convicted of violent sexual offenses who are targeted as potentially recidivistic pedophilesthere are important, and troubling, points in common in the structures of these two kinds of laws. Moreover, they both demonstrate comfort with a system in which many functions of civil and criminal mental disability law merge. Remarkably, no one, until now, has commented on this phenomenon.
how can this link be "proven" in any case? And to what extent is this connected to the "blur" issue?
8. Role of other "players": Are there sufficient "authorized personnel" 121 in New York's many sparsely-populated, rural counties to assure that ordered medication is administered? Say a patient resists assisted outpatient treatment because of a prior negative reaction to antipsychotic medication or a fear of permanent and irreversible side effects (a fear which has led the United States Supreme Court to conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty clause is implicated in drug side-effect cases). 122 What will the outcome of such hearings be? And suppose that a patient asks for an independent psychiatric expert. Kendra's Law provides a right to counsel 123 but there is no right to an independent expert. In Goetz v. Crosson, 124 the Second Circuit held that the due process clause did not require the appointment of a psychiatrist in every involuntary civil commitment case, 125 but added:
Some proceedings may present a need for independent psychiatric testimony in addition to that offered by the state to ensure an accurate decision. As a practical matter such proceedings are limited to cases in which the presiding judge determines that the record leaves unexplored or unanswered questions and that additional psychiatric testimony is necessary. In such cases, the individual's interests in both freedom and self-protection are directly affected, and the failure to provide such testimony may implicate due process concerns. A physician who testifies [in an outpatient commitment hearing] shall state the facts which support the allegation that the subject meets each of the criteria for assisted outpatient treatment, and the treatment is the least restrictive alternative, the recommended assisted outpatient treatment, and the rationale for the recommended assisted outpatient treatment. If the recommended assisted outpatient treatment includes medication, such physician's testimony shall describe the types or classes of medication which should be authorized, shall describe the beneficial and detrimental physical and mental effects of such medication, and shall recommend whether such medication should be selfadministered or administered by authorized personnel.
130
To what extent can this be rationalized with the New York Court of Appeals decision in Rivers v. Katz, 131 articulating the broadest right-to-refuse-treatment decision in any American jurisdiction (premised exclusively on state common and constitutional law). Rivers ordered-in most cases 132 -a counseled, due process decision with respect to proposed treatment before the drugs may be administered pursuant to the State's parens patriae power." 133 The court restated the "firmly established" and "faithfully adhered to" common-law principles 134 that "every individual of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his body'" 135 and to control the course of his medical treatment. 136 In the case of competent patients, this "fundamental" right-coextensive with the patient's liberty interest protected by the state constitution's due process clause 137 -must be honored "even though the recommended treatment may be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient's life."
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How can the breadth of the Rivers case be reconciled with the forced treatment aspects of Kendra's Law? This is something that will and must be addressed (since, left unresolved, it would result in the anomalous situation of in-patients having many more rights than out-patients) in the coming years. Although Kendra's Law has withstood its first Rivers challenge at a trial court level in the recent case of Matter of Urcuyo, 139 this is far from a settled issue. Involuntary commitment is not proof of incapacity to make such treatment decisions, 140 and Kendra's Law states that a determination of commitability for outpatient treatment "shall not be construed as or deemed to be a determination that such patient is incapacitated . . . ."
141 Asks Professor Keri Gould, one of Kendra's Law's most important critics: "How then, can a court order for involuntary medication be enforced against a competent outpatient committee without an explicit constitutional violation?" involuntary civil commitment law -that while only a handful of reported involuntary civil commitment cases have ever frontally considered right to refuse treatment claims, courts routinely weigh experts' predictions of a patient's potential refusal to take antipsychotic medication in a community setting as the most probative evidence on the question of whether involuntary civil commitment is warranted, even in jurisdictions that have broad right-to-refuse decisions in place. 143 What if a person subject to Kendra's Law had been successful in a Rivers action while an inpatient? 144 Would that be admissible in a determination of whether such a person is likely to fail to comply with assisted outpatient treatment? 145 In short, there is a host of difficult questions-policy questions, financial questions, legal questions, treatment questions, political questions-that we have not addressed through the courts or other institutions. Until these questions are seriously and thoughtfully considered, we will not be able to resolve important core Kendra's Law issues.
V. First Cases
Since Kendra's Law was enacted, a handful of cases have touched on its scope. 146 The most important of these is Matter of Urcuyo. 147 The trial court in Urcuyo upheld Kendra's Law against a Rivers-based challenge, because Kendra's Law did not "require the forcible administration of medication," 148 and similarly rejected an equal protection challenge, reasoning that "that the different treatment for assisted outpatient subjects as opposed to [alleged incapacitated persons] and involuntarily committed psychiatric patients is warranted." 149 Justice Cutrona concluded:
Clearly, the state has a compelling interest in taking measures to prevent these patients who pose such a high risk from becoming a danger to the community and themselves. Kendra's Law provides the means by which society does not have to sit idly by and watch the cycle of decompensation, dangerousness and hospitalization continually repeat itself. Moreover, as previously discussed, Kendra's Law is narrowly tailored to achieve these goals within the framework of the involuntary and emergency commitment procedures of the Mental Hygiene Law.
In conclusion, for all of the foregoing reasons, respondents' motion for a declaration that Mental Hygiene Law 9.60 is unconstitutional absent a requirement that a respondent lacks the capacity to make a reasoned treatment decision before an Assisted Outpatient Treatment order can be granted, is denied.
150
Only one other reported case has discussed medication issues in a Kendra's law context, albeit in dicta. There, in In re Conticchio, 151 a guardianship application, the court sought to reconcile Kendra's Law and the Rivers decision in this way:
The recently passed legislation known as Kendra's law . . . is based on the dangers that can arise from schizophrenics and other mentally disturbed persons who cease or refuse to take their necessary medication. While said law is apparently based more on the State's police power (see Rivers . . . ), it reemphasizes the importance of not permitting interruptions in the treatment of such individuals. 152 150 
Id.
In addition to Urcuyo, a few other cases also provide a window into the attitudes of the trial judges to whom Kendra's Law dockets have been assigned. In Matter of Arden Hill Hospital, the court held that the county was responsible for costs of the patient's outpatient mental health services that were not covered by Medicaid or insurance. 703 N.Y.S. 2d 902 (Orange Cty. 2000) In relatively strong language, the trial judge (Justice Bivona) read the law as reflecting a legislative finding that "even if a hospital operates an outpatient treatment program that this does not absolve the director of community services' responsibility for operation of such a program," id. at 905, flatly rejecting the county's arguments that the hospital should bear the responsibility for any costs, and finding it to be "solely" the county director of community services to be responsible for provision of services, id. at 906.
In other cases, courts have variously found that a patient could be ordered to be evaluated by a physician without a prior hearing, Matter of Longo, 715 N.Y.S. 2d 833 (Supreme Ct., Monroe Cty. 2000), and that the commission of a violent act during the patient's present psychiatric hospitalization could be used to satisfy the "one or more violent acts" criteria of the law. Matter of Weinstock, 2001 WL 290238 (Supreme Ct. 2001). This case was decided by Justice Cutrona, the same judge who decided Urcuyo, supra.
In cases that have turned on questions of procedure, one court in Queens County has found a doctor's conclusory statements in an affidavit insufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of the law (and that this failure was a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect), In re Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S. 2d 853 (Queens Cty. 2000), and another one has found that the physician-patient evidentiary privilege did not prevent a patient's treating psychiatrist from submitting an affidavit or giving testimony in support of the director's petition, In re Sullivan, 710 N.Y.S. 2d 804 (Queens Cty. 2000). A King's County case has concluded that "any instances of non-compliance with treatment, no matter how recent, would be relevant in determining whether or not a patient will be compliant in the future." In re Dailey, 713 N.Y.S. 2d 660 (Supreme Ct. 2000). This case was also decided by Justice Cutrona, the same judge who decided Urcuyo and Weinstock, supra.
151 696 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (Nassau Cty. 1999). 152 Id. at 774.
Conticchio has not been cited in subsequent cases, so it is not clear what impact, if any, this will have on actual Kendra's Law cases on this question. In a non-Kendra's Law case that was ancillary to the criminal prosecution of Andrew Goldstein-the individual subsequently convicted of murdering Kendra Webdale, after whom Kendra's Law was named-another court, in the course of a decision ordering the production of records from a private hospital, looked at the language of Kendra's Law to conclude that, in addition to establishing an OPC plan, the law was geared to "improve coordination of care for mentally ill persons living in the community, expand the use of conditional release in psychiatric hospitals, and improve dissemination of information between and among health providers and general hospital emergency rooms." 153 What about in non-reported cases? At an Association of the Bar of the City of New York panel discussion in 2000, it was revealed that, of the 163 petitions granted in Kendra's Law cases throughout New York state, 131 of them arose in New York City. 154 In responding to this information, Westchester County Supreme Court Justice John P. DiBlasi, characterized this large number of petitions granted in New York is a "cause for concern," especially since the burden of proof required to make out a prima facie case under Kendra's Law is so high. 155 Justice DiBlasi said he was worried that judges-who may be motivated more by protecting the public rather than compelling patients to get needed treatmentmay decide to err on the side of caution. 156 decision is, to my mind, utterly unpersuasive, and in no way resolves the Rivers-related questions raised earlier.
I am also gravely concerned about the way that Kendra's Law blurs the relationship between civil and criminal mental disability law. By widening the net of persons who can come within the ambit of the public mental health system, by investing certain prison and parole officers with putative mental health "expertise," and by making it appear to the public that there is a causal connection between mental illness and dangerousness, 166 Kendra's Law may distort-even further-the public's view of persons with mental illness.
Kendra's Law may also be too easy of an alternative to involuntary civil commitment. Certainly, many of the persons who come within its ambit are perceived as "undesirable," and persons who many would rather simply see locked away, people that they want off the street. 167 Another troubling aspect of Kendra's Law is the fact that a treatment order can be rendered without the individual actually being present in court. 168 If the person's presence cannot be secured, after attempts having been made, the court may proceed without the person being present. The statute does not define how many attempts must be made, or what can be considered a reasonable attempt. It is vague and ambiguous, and leads to the danger of a significant number of these Kendra's Law treatment orders being handed down in absentia. This raises profound antitherapeutic implications.
Finally, the most recent broad-based studies conclude that, while there is some evidence of improved outcomes for people with severe mental illness under involuntary outpatient treatment, that that evidence only emerges when the court order is combined with intensive mental health services. The study-commissioned by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice on behalf of the California legislature-concluded that, "there is no evidence that a court order alone helps achieve compliance or good outcomes."
